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Abstract
Twelve participants were trained to be experts at identifying a set of ‘Greebles’, novel objects that, like faces, all share a
common spatial configuration. Tests comparing expert with novice performance revealed: (1) a surprising mix of generalizability
and specificity in expert object recognition processes; and (2) that expertise is a multi-faceted phenomenon, neither adequately
described by a single term nor adequately assessed by a single task. Greeble recognition by a simple neural-network model is also
evaluated, and the model is found to account surprisingly well for both generalization and individuation using a single set of
processes and representations. © 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Are the mechanisms used by perceivers as they be-
come increasingly familiar with an object class the same
as those used by perceivers when they first encounter
the class? To date, expertise in object recognition has
been discussed primarily in relation to face recognition,
and much of this discussion has focused on the hypoth-
esis that faces are recognized through a specialized
brain module, separate from the system used to recog-
nize other classes of objects [1]. However, two factors
distinguish face recognition from recognition of other
classes of objects [2]: first, we recognize faces at a
subordinate, rather than the basic, level [3], and second,
we are experts at recognizing faces, while we are not
expert recognizers of most other types of object. Al-
though expert recognition processes may be most often
applied to faces, and novice, basic-level categorization
may be sufficient for many of our interactions with
other types of objects, there are many contexts in which
observers must discriminate among individual exem-
plars of non-face object classes. For instance, salespeo-
ple need to distinguish between different models of cars,
shoes, or sports rackets; lumberjacks need to be able to
recognize individual trees, and fighter pilots need to
identify different types of planes. These individuals will
all have extensive experience with such categories (i.e.
they are experts), but other people with less experience
will still be able to make the same kind of discrimina-
tions, even if they do so less efficiently than experts.
Therefore, individual face recognition may be seen as
but the most salient example of an expert, subordinate-
level recognition problem [2]. Other such problems,
which vary along a continuum of difficulty and for
which observers vary along a continuum of expertise,
may be approachable in a qualitatively similar way.
Two basic hypotheses underly our study: One is that
expertise may mediate many apparent dissociations that
occur in visual recognition (such as that between face
and object recognition) and the second is that tuning of
a single kind of visual representation can subserve both
novice and expert object recognition performance, re-
gardless of the object class.
In this paper, we build on a training method first
developed by Gauthier and Tarr [4] to explore in more
detail the process of expertise acquisition. Twelve par-* Corresponding author. E-mail: isabel.gauthier@yale.edu.
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Fig. 1. Greebles can be grouped into two different ‘genders’ (PLOKs and GLIPs) and several different ‘families’.
ticipants were trained for approximately nine hours
each to become expert recognizers of a novel class of
object called Greebles (Fig. 1). The performance of
these experts on several tasks known or suspected to be
affected by expertise was compared to novices’ perfor-
mance on the tasks. Section 3 examines learning names
for new (not seen during training) sets of Greebles,
Sections 4 and 5 use tests designed to reveal ‘configural’
and:or ‘holistic’ [5] processing, and Section 6 tests for
possible limits on experts’ Greeble recognition abilities.
Finally, we present a simple neural-network model that
demonstrates how a single recognition system can sub-
serve both individual- and class-level recognition and
lead to some of the expertise effects found in the
present study using the same processes and representa-
tions.
All Greebles share similar parts in a common spatial
configuration, so like faces, Greebles are only distin-
guishable on the basis of ‘second-order properties’ [6],
i.e. configurations of parts. Furthermore, the testing
conditions we adopted were motivated in large part by
findings from the face recognition literature. Therefore,
findings that putative face-specific effects can be ob-
tained with Greebles may be taken as evidence that the
visual system neither requires nor possesses a module
specifically dedicated to face recognition per se. Beyond
the question of how faces are recognized, we hope to
address the more general issue of how the visual object
recognition system adapts to more efficiently process
any overlearned class of homogeneous stimuli that
must be individuated.
2. Expert training
Because so few experimental studies of perceptual
expertise have been reported, little is known about the
best methods for manipulating the level of expertise. It
is obvious that experts are generally more experienced
than novices, but it is not clear exactly how much
experience is necessary to produce significant ‘expertise
effects’. It is also unclear how one should deal with
individual differences in the rate of learning.
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There are essentially two types of training methods
that one can adopt: all participants can receive a fixed
amount of training that the experimenters hope will be
enough to result in expertise, or each participant can
receive a variable amount of training, until he or she
reaches a pre-specified criterion. Gauthier and Tarr [4]
used the latter strategy, training participants until they
were as fast to recognize Greebles at the individual level
as they were to recognize them at a more categorical
level. This criterion was derived from a study by
Tanaka and Taylor [7], who found that expert dog
judges and birdwatchers were as fast at recognizing
different types of dogs and birds at the subordinate
level as they were at recognizing dogs and birds at the
categorical level (whereas novices were much faster to
say that an object was a ‘bird’ than that it was a
‘sparrow’). An important advantage of this procedure is
that if we accept the assumption that the criterion is an
adequate measure of expertise level, we can be reason-
ably confident that at the conclusion of training, all
participants will be experts. Also, experts’ performance
may be more meaningfully compared across studies
that manipulate various aspects of the training proce-
dure, again assuming that participants reach the crite-
rion only once they are experts, and assuming that all
aspects of expertise are equally assessed by the crite-
rion.
Unfortunately, there is always a danger that some
participants will reach the criterion, and thus their
training will be terminated, before they are actually
experts. Furthermore, the criterion training method
makes it somewhat difficult to assess the results of tasks
performed during the training procedure itself, since
different participants will go through different amounts
of training. Therefore, in the present study, we elected
to have each participant perform exactly the same
training procedure. However, we used Gauthier and
Tarr’s results [4] as a guide, training all of our partici-
pant;s longer than the average time necessary for par-
ticipants in Gauthier and Tarr’s study to reach the
expertise criterion. We were also able to assess if and
when each participant in our study would have met the
expertise criterion adopted by Gauthier and Tarr.
Section 2 presents the method and results of the
present training procedure. Besides training for a set
amount of time rather than to a criterion, our proce-
dure differed in several other important ways from the
one used by Gauthier and Tarr [4]. First, whereas
Gauthier and Tarr trained participants to classify Gree-
bles at three different levels (gender, family, and indi-
vidual; see Fig. 1), we only included gender- and
individual-level training. Second, we required partici-
pants to discriminate 20 different Greebles at the indi-
vidual level, as opposed to ten in Gauthier and Tarr’s
study. Finally, the present procedure used a more het-
erogeneous group of training tasks: Gauthier and Tarr
had participants perform the same Verification task (see
below for a description of this task) over and over for
the bulk of the training, while we required participants
to alternate between the Verification task and a Nam-
ing task during most of the training sessions. The latter
two changes were intended to make the training more
difficult, under the assumption that the harder partici-
pants had to work during training, the more expertise
they would develop with Greebles.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Twelve undergraduates from Oberlin College partici-
pated in the experiment in return for cash payment.
2.1.2. Materials
The stimuli were 30 Greebles [4], photorealistically-
rendered 3D objects that all share a common configura-
tion. Each Greeble is made up of a vertically-oriented
‘body’ with four protruding ‘appendages’, from top to
bottom, two ‘boges’, a ‘quiff’ and a ‘dunth’. As shown
in Fig. 1, Greebles can be easily categorized into two
different classes, which we will refer to as ‘genders’, on
the basis of the orientation of appendages (up or
down), and into five different ‘families’ on the basis of
the shape of the main body. These two categorical
dimensions are orthogonal, rather than hierarchical:
Each individual Greeble is a member of one gender and
one family, and is distinguishable from other members
of its gender and family by the shapes of its ap-
pendages. Every appendage is unique in the set, al-
though some pairs are more similar than others. The
two genders and 20 of the individual Greebles (ten of
each gender and four of each family) were given non-
sense-word labels (e.g. ‘vali’ or ‘pimo’); each label
started with a different letter. The Greebles were all
rendered with the same purple shade, stippled texture,
and overhead lighting direction. Images were about 6.5
cm high3.25 cm wide, and when viewed from about
60 cm from the screen, yielded a display area of ap-
proximately 6.23.1° of visual angle. The experiments
were conducted on Macintosh computers equipped with
color monitors (72 pixels per in.).
2.1.3. Procedure
The training procedure required participants to learn
and then practice recognizing the Greebles at both the
gender and individual levels. In all, each participant
was trained for approximately 9 h, during ten 1-h
sessions spread out over 2 weeks. Each session included
some combination of seven different tasks:
1. Gender inspect—participants saw Greebles along
with their gender labels, and made no response.
2. Gender categorization—participants saw Greebles
without labels, and pressed the ‘P’ key for ‘ploks’ or
the ‘G’ key for ‘glips’.
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3. Indi6idual inspect—participants saw Greebles with
their names and made no response.
4. Naming with response—participants saw Greebles
with their names and pressed the key corresponding
to the first letter of the name.
5. Naming with feedback—participants saw Greebles
without names, attempted to press the correct key to
name the Greeble, and if incorrect, saw the Greeble
again, this time with its correct name.
6. Naming—participants saw Greebles alone and at-
tempted to name them.
7. Verification—participants saw either a gender label
or an individual name for 1000 ms, then after a
pause of 200 ms saw a Greeble, and responded with
one key if they thought the Greeble matched the
label:name, or another key if they thought the Gree-
ble and label:name did not match.
Every trial in all tasks was preceded by a fixation
cross shown for 250 ms, and in tasks that required a
response, participants always heard a ‘beep’ when they
responded incorrectly.
The specific order of tests in each session is shown in
Table 1. Note that participants learned the gender
labels and names for five individual Greebles in the first
session, then learned five more Greebles in each of the
following three sessions. In the individual inspect, nam-
ing with response, and naming with feedback tests,
participants only saw Greebles for which they had
learned names. In the naming and verification tasks,
however, all 30 training Greebles were shown, even if
participants did not know names for them. The correct
response for unnamed Greebles in the naming task was
to press the space bar (designated the NIL response).
Each Greeble was shown twice in this task, for a total
of 60 trials. When unnamed Greebles were seen in the
verification task, participants were to respond ‘same’ if
they were preceded by a NIL label, or ‘different’ if they
were preceded by the name of another Greeble. Thus
there were seven different types of verification trials: a
gender label could be followed by a Greeble from that
gender or a different one; an individual name could be
followed by the appropriate Greeble, a Greeble that
was known by another name, or an unnamed Greeble;
or a NIL label could be followed by an unnamed or a
named Greeble. Each Greeble was seen four times in
the verification task, once each following the correct
gender label, the incorrect gender label, the correct
individual name (or NIL), and the incorrect individual
name (or NIL).
2.1.4. Analyses
Data from the verification and naming tasks were
analyzed for trends over the course of training. Since
results varied fairly widely from test to test for individ-
ual participants, we combined groups of tests into
‘bins’. Bin 1 included naming tests c1–2 and verifica-
Table 1
Training procedure
TaskTrials
Session 1
Gender inspect (ten Greebles at once)1
10 Gender inspect
30 Gender categorization
10 Individual inspect (set 1a)
10 Naming with response (set 1)
Naming with feedback (set 1)15
Naming60
Verification120
Gender categorization30
Naming with response (set 1)10
Naming60
Verification120
Total trials this session476
Session 2
6 Gender inspect
20 Naming with response (set 1)
Verification120
Individual inspect (set 2)10
10 Naming with response (set 2)
30 Naming with feedback (sets 1:2)
60 Naming
Verification120
736 Total trials this session
Session 3
6 Gender inspect
40 Naming with response (sets 1:2)
120 Verification
10 Individual inspect (set 3)
10 Naming with response (set 3)
45 Naming with feedback (sets 1:2:3)
60 Naming
120 Verification
771 Total trials this session
Session 4
6 Gender inspect
60 Naming with response (sets 1:2:3)
120 Verification
10 Individual inspect (set 4)
10 Naming with response (set 4)
60 Naming with feedback (sets 1:2:3:4)
60 Naming
120 Verification
806 Total trials this session
Sessions 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
40 Naming with response (sets 1:2:3:4)
60 Naming
120 Verification
760 Total trials these sessions
Session 10
Naming with response (sets 1:2:3:4)40
60 Naming
Verification120
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Table 1 (continued)
Trials Task
220 Total trials this session
a Sets 1, 2, 3, and 4 refer to the first, second, third, and fourth group
of 5 Greebles whose individual names were learned during training.
See text for descriptions of test tasks.
for the 20 named training Greebles. Remarkably, ex-
perts achieved a 58% accuracy rate on the first test, and
85% on the second test; chance performance would
have been 5%.
Note that the proportion of named and unnamed
trials varied during the first four bins of training. In the
first bin of tests, five Greebles were named and 25
unnamed; just before the first test in the second, third,
and fourth bins, participants learned names for five
previously unnamed Greebles. Thus, each of these four
bins had progressively more Greebles that required
participants to retrieve names and progressively fewer
Greebles that required a NIL response. Intuitively, it
might seem that these changes would result in more
difficult naming judgments, since more Greebles must
be individually distinguished from one another, and less
difficult NIL responses, since fewer Greebles require
this response. Contrary to this intuition, participants
became progressively faster and more accurate at mak-
ing name responses and slower at making NIL re-
sponses in this period. These trends were confirmed by
a significant interaction between trial type and bin for
these four bins, F(3, 33)31.2 for response time and
F(3, 33)19.9 for accuracy. Performance on both
types of trials increased (i.e. response times got faster)
from the fourth bin on. These effects were also appar-
ent in most of the individual participants’ results, as
seen in Fig. 3.
This pattern of results probably reflects a combina-
tion of several factors. As more and more Greebles
were distinguished as individuals, it became more likely
that an unnamed Greeble would be similar to a named
one, and thus more difficult to label as NIL. Of course,
it also became more likely that a named Greeble would
be similar to another named Greeble. Apparently, this
tion tests c1–3, bin 2 included naming tests c3–5
and verification tests c4–7, bin 3 included naming
tests c6–8 and verification tests c8–11, and subse-
quent bins included three naming and three verification
tests. These bins were constructed so that: (a) there
were an equivalent number (11) of bins for the naming
and verification tests; (b) there were approximately the
same number of tests (2–3 for naming and 3–4 for
verification) in each bin, and (c) bins 1, 2, 3 and 4
included tests for which participants had to identify 5,
10, 15 and 20 different Greebles, respectively, at the
individual level. That is, participants learned the first
five individual Greebles names just before the first test
in bin 1, learned the second five names just before the
first test in bin 2, and learned the third and fourth set
of names just before the first tests in bins 3 and 4,
respectively. Accuracy and response times, averaged
across tests in each bin, were analyzed for each individ-
ual participant and for all participants combined. Un-
less otherwise noted, all response times reported in this
paper are geometric means (which are less susceptible
to the effects of outliers than are arithmetic means),
calculated on correct trials only. An alpha level of 0.05
was adopted for all inferential statistics, and signifi-
cance levels are only reported for marginally significant
(between 0.05 and 0.10) tests.
2.2. Results and discussion
2.2.1. Naming task
Group means for naming test performance are shown
in Fig. 2. ‘Named’ trials (solid lines and squares in the
graph) are those on which participants saw a Greeble
for which they knew a name, and were required to press
the key corresponding to the first letter of the name.
For ‘unnamed’ trials (dashed lines and triangles in the
graph), participants did not know a name for the
Greeble, and pressed the space bar (for the NIL re-
sponse) to indicate this fact. Participants were strikingly
good at naming Greebles. By the fourth bin (which
included tests from the fourth training session), at
which point participants were performing a 20-key
naming task, participants were naming Greebles in
about 1500 ms per trial, and achieving greater than 95%
accuracy. Furthermore, ten of our 12 experts returned
8–13 weeks after the last training session for further
testing, and received two Naming with Feedback tests
Fig. 2. Performance on the naming task throughout training. Num-
bers above the accuracy graph indicate the number of Greebles
participants knew the names for in each bin of tests.
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Fig. 3. Performance on the naming task throughout training for each expert participant.
cost was outweighed by the benefits gained from in-
creased fluency with Greebles whose names were al-
ready practiced. Participants may have also been
learning individuating information about unnamed
Greebles even though they were associating all of these
Greebles with the same response. This would hurt
performance on Greebles that still required NIL re-
sponses, since any familiar Greeble would seem to
require a name. However, it could help participants
with newly-named Greebles, because these Greebles
would already have been somewhat familiar to partici-
pants at the time when their names were being acquired
(this would also account for why performance on un-
named Greebles got better from the fourth bin on,
when no more new names had to be learned).
If this were the case, then Greebles whose names
were learned later in the training procedure should have
been easier to learn to name. A post-hoc analysis of the
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Fig. 4. Performance on ‘yes’ trials in the verification task throughout training. Numbers above the accuracy graph indicate the number of Greebles
participants knew names for in each bin of tests. As indicated by the arrow on the RT graph, the significance level of the difference between
Gender and individual-named trials, as computed by post-hoc LSD tests, was not significant for the 6th bin onward.
naming data supports this prediction: Mean accuracy
for the first set of named Greebles in the first bin of
tests was 0.72; while accuracy for the second, third,
and fourth sets of named Greebles, which were ini-
tially named in the second, third, and fourth bins of
tests, was 0.78, 0.91 and 0.91, respectively. These dif-
ferences were significant, F(3, 33)16.2. However,
since we did not plan this analysis, we did not prop-
erly counterbalance the order in which participants
learned to name the Greebles, so at least part of the
effect could be due to idiosyncrasies in which Greebles
were included in each set. Furthermore, improvement
in name-learning with training could also have been
due to more general ‘learning to learn’—i.e. partici-
pants could have learned what distinguishing informa-
tion to look for when forced to individuate new
Greebles. Nevertheless, this analysis suggests that
learning effects in the absence of identification may be
an interesting avenue for future research in the exper-
tise-training paradigm.
2.2.2. Verification tests
Group means for ‘same’ trials on the verification test
are shown in Fig. 4, and individual means for each
participant in Fig. 5. These are trials in which partici-
pants saw a gender label (circles and long-dashed lines
in the figure), an individual name (squares and solid
lines), or the NIL label (triangles and short-dashed
lines), then saw a Greeble that matched this label.
Results for corresponding ‘different’ trials are consis-
tent with these data, but are left off the graphs for
clarity.
Looking first at the relationship between individual-
named and individual-unnamed trials, we see some
important similarities and differences with the naming
task. As was the case with naming, over the first four
bins of trials, participants got progressively faster at
matching names with correctly-named Greebles, but
progressively slower at matching the NIL label with
unnamed Greebles. This pattern was significant, F(3,
33)21.59, and probably reflects the same mechanisms
discussed in connection with the Naming task. When
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Fig. 5. Performance on ‘yes’ trials in the verification task throughout training for each expert participant. The arrow on each graph indicates the
first bin on which the participant’s performance on individual-named trials was not significantly different from performance on gender trials.
naming Greebles, however, participants were almost
always faster to make NIL decisions than name deci-
sions, whereas when verifying the match between labels
and Greebles, participants were almost always slower
for NIL than for named trials. This dissociation reflects
an important difference between the two tasks. When
given a name in the verification task, participants can
generate an expectation for the Greeble they may sub-
sequently see. If the Greeble matches this expectation,
they can respond ‘same’; otherwise, they respond ‘dif-
ferent’. However, it is difficult to generate an expecta-
tion from the NIL label, since so many different
Greebles are assigned to this label.
During the first bin of tests, participants were pre-
sumably able to quickly reject unnamed Greebles as
any of the five that they knew names for, and as a
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result, ten of the 12 participants were faster on NIL
trials than on named trials. As more Greebles became
labeled over the following three bins, however, this
process became more time-consuming, and participants
quickly became slower on NIL than on named trials.
Interestingly, seven participants (AS, CMB, DMP,
DRB, EEB, KRH, and MMZ) showed a pattern of
gradual improvement on NIL trials from at least the
fourth bin onward, while performance for the other five
participants on the NIL trials declined throughout the
course of training. Four of these five participants also
failed to improve on NIL trials in the naming task (the
exception was NMT, who improved dramatically be-
tween bins 4 and 5, but then stayed at roughly this
same level throughout the remainder of the training).
This correspondence leads us to suspect that partici-
pants used one of two different strategies for dealing
with unnamed Greebles. Perhaps the non-improvers
continued with the strategy of going through each of
the named Greebles before concluding that a Greeble
was unnamed, whereas the improvers learned to explic-
itly associate all of the unnamed Greebles with the NIL
label and response. The former strategy could explain
why some participants were actually worse in later bins
than earlier ones. As unnamed Greebles become more
familiar, it would become more difficult to determine
that it is not a named Greeble.
Turning to the relationship between individual-
named and gender trials, we see that nearly all of the
participants were at some point as fast to verify a
Greeble’s individual name as they were to verify a
Greeble’s gender (or at least not reliably slower), and
thus would have reached the criterion used by Gauthier
and Tarr [4] for completion of training. To assess
exactly when participants in our experiments would
have passed this criterion, we performed ANOVAs
including the factors of bin number (1–11) and trial
type (individual-named and gender) on both the group
data and on each individual participant’s data. Arrows
in Figs. 4 and 5 indicate the bin on which the signifi-
cance level of LSD tests computed from these
ANOVAs first rose above the 0.05 level.1
A more stringent criterion could also require that
performance on the Gender trials be at an asymptotic
level. Applying such a restriction to the present data
would shift the criterion by at least one bin for partici-
pants EEB, MMZ, and NJK. Participant KRH never
met our criterion, and showed signs of asymptoting in
the last three bins, meaning that even given further
training, he might not have reached the criterion. Par-
ticipant ADP produced a pattern of response times
remarkably different than any of the other 11 experts:
He was significantly faster on individual-named than on
gender trials in the very first bin, but showed no
systematic improvement in response times for any of
the trial conditions. Moreover, although his overall hit
rate (averaged across all bins) for named Greebles was
not abnormally low (0.94, as compared to an average of
0.97 across all participants), his false alarm rate (re-
sponding ‘same’ when the correct answer was ‘differ-
ent’) for these Greebles was 0.19, whereas the average
for all participants was 0.06. His performance on Gen-
der trials, both when the correct response was ‘yes’ or
‘no,’ was also atrocious. Interestingly, however, his
performance pattern in subsequent tests (described in
Sections 3–6) did not differ qualitatively from that of
other experts. His data was therefore included in all
subsequent analyses.
2.2.3. Verification–naming correlations
Data from the verification tests indicate a quantita-
tive effect of expertise training: Over the course of the
ten training sessions, the difference in mean response
time between verifying a Greeble’s gender and verifying
a Greeble’s individual identity systematically decreased
from an average of just over 500 ms to essentially 0.
While this quantitative shift alone indicates a certain
amount of expertise with the Greebles, one could argue
that perceptual expertise should be defined not only by
this overall increase in performance but also by a
qualitative shift in the type of information used to
recognize an object. Did our participants show such a
qualitative shift in the course of becoming experts? One
indicator would be a change in the relative difficulty
with which individual Greebles were recognized. That
is, if the information used by participants to identify
Greebles changed over the course of the training proce-
dure, then different Greebles might be expected to be
easy or hard to identify at the beginning than at the end
of training. To get more stable means for individual
Greebles, we performed this analysis on four larger
groups of six to eight tests each. We also limited the
analysis to the first two sets of Greebles (ten individu-
als) for which names were learned, since the final set
was not learned until the fourth session, at which point
many participants had already reached (or were very
close to reaching) the expertise criterion. All reported
correlations are on response times, since accuracy levels
were very high throughout training.
When means for each Greeble were computed across
all 12 participants, the Pearson product–moment corre-
lation between name verification performance on the
first and last group of tests was a very large 0.75,
whereas the correlation between naming performance
on these two groups of tests was only 0.41. Looking at
each individual participant’s data separately, eight of
the 12 participants showed a larger correlation for the
1 Note that we were actually being conservative in this analysis by
using the LSD test, since a more stringent post-hoc test would have
resulted in quicker estimates of when participants reached the expert
level.
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verification than for the Naming test. Interestingly, the
correlation between performance on the two tests was
initially very high (0.91 in the first group of tests), but
decreased dramatically over the course of training
(0.81, 0.59 and 0.29 for the second, third, and fourth
groups of tests). Overall, this data indicates that most
participants initially relied on the same type of informa-
tion to perform the verification and naming tasks, but
that the informational basis of Naming decisions
changed over the course of training, while the informa-
tional basis of Verification decisions remained roughly
the same.2
2.3. O6er6iew of expertise training
Most participants in our expertise training eventually
became as good at identifying Greebles at the individ-
ual level as they were at identifying the Greebles at the
gender level. Gauthier and Tarr [4] took this pattern of
performance as their criterion for demonstrating per-
ceptual expertise with the Greebles, based on the fact
that the same pattern of results was found by Tanaka
and Taylor [7] for dog and bird experts. In Gauthier
and Tarr’s procedure, participants practiced identifying
Greebles over and over through the same verification
test that served as the criterion for expertise. In con-
trast, the present procedure effectively substituted trials
on the naming task for trials Verification test, as these
tests were alternated throughout training. Furthermore,
our procedure required participants to learn twice as
many Greebles (20 vs. 10) as did Gauthier and Tarr’s
procedure [4], which should have made it much more
difficult to individuate the Greebles whose names had
to be verified on the verification task. The fact that
most of our participants reached the verification test
criterion after roughly the same amount of training as
the participants in Gauthier and Tarr’s study indicates
that this criterion may reflect something general about
perceiving Greebles, and is not purely task-specific.
The results of Section 2 also raise several questions
about the factors infiuencing object recognition exper-
tise training. For example, participants learned to name
Greebles that they were experienced with through NIL
trials more rapidly than when they did not have this
prior experience. One course for future study is to
investigate how much of this effect was due to informa-
tion participants acquired about Greebles in general
and how much due to information about those specific
Greebles. Another issue involves the relationship be-
tween the verification and naming tests. Conceptually,
these two tasks seem very similar, and they are often
treated as more or less equivalent in the object recogni-
tion literature. The present results suggest that while
participants initially used similar types of information
on both tests, the informational bases for the two tasks
diverged over the course of training. Additional re-
search is needed to determine whether this finding
represents a general property of perceptual expertise or
a specialized strategy developed by our participants in
response to the specific demands of our training proce-
dure and stimulus set.
3. Learning new sets of Greebles
Intuitively, the most obvious way to assess expertise
with a perceptual category is to determine how well
experts learn new exemplars of the category. After their
training had been completed, our experts learned four
sets of six new Greebles. Sets A and B (Fig. 6) were
presented immediately following the final training ses-
sion,3 while the other two sets of test Greebles, C and D,
(Fig. 6) were learned in a second test session that was
separated by 8–13 weeks from the last training session
(only ten of the 12 experts participated in the second test
session). If our trained participants were truly Greeble
experts, we expected them to be able to learn all new
sets of Greebles more easily than control groups of
novice participants who received no prior training with
the Greebles (separate groups of 12 novices each learned
the first and second pairs of test sets).
In designing the four test sets, we were interested in
what information participants relied upon when learn-
ing new Greebles. Sets A and B were taken from the
same pool of Greebles as the training objects, each of
the two sets including Greebles from a single gender
and three Greebles from each of two families. As in the
training set, then, these test sets included Greebles with
fairly heterogeneous collections of appendage parts,
3 Unfortunately, we mistakenly used one of the Greebles from the
original training set as a member of Test Set B. In response to
debriefing questions, six of the 12 experts spontaneously mentioned
this correspondence, but all of them said only that the Greeble on the
test set ‘looked like’ or was ‘similar to’ the training Greeble, and
several of these experts also mentioned at the same time that other
test Greebles were similar to training Greebles. Four of the six experts
who mentioned noticing the correspondence claimed that it hurt their
test performance, because they had to associate the Greeble with a
new name. An examination of mean performance for each Greeble
confirmed this intuition: Experts’ performance on this Greeble was
less accurate than all of the other 11. Greebles from the first two test
sets and slower than all but two of the other Greebles. Therefore, we
left the repeated Greeble in our analyses, since doing so could only
weaken our hypothesis that experts were better at learning new
Greebles than were novices.
2 The same pattern of Naming and Verification diverging over the
course of expertise of training and of Naming changing more than
Verification was recently replicated in an ongoing training study by
the first author. This occurred even though this second cohort of
Greeble experts were trained on the individual and family levels
rather than on the individual and gender levels as in the current
study, suggesting that this result does not depend on specific factors
of the training procedure.
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Fig. 6. Four sets of Greebles learned by both experts and novices during test sessions.
while body shape information, which defines family
membership, was relatively uninformative. Sets C and
D were both constructed with more homogeneous parts
than any randomly selected set of six training Greebles.
However, in designing set C we made the body shape
information maximally diagnostic (that is, each Greeble
has a different body shape) while in set D all Greebles
shared exactly the same body shape.
The procedure for teaching participants names for
test sets involved the same tasks as were used in expert-
training sessions, and is summarized in Table 2. Note
that all participants performed the naming test at least
three times on each set of test Greebles, but if a perfect
score was not obtained on the third test, the participant
was required to repeat the naming with feedback and
naming tasks until this criterion was met (or until they
had completed 13 naming tasks).
One measure of learning facility is how quickly par-
ticipants passed the criterion of a perfect score on one
test. As seen in Table 3, the mean number of tests to
reach criterion was smaller for experts than for novices
on all four test sets. The difference between experts and
novices was not significant for any one test set alone,
but was significant when all four sets were considered
together, t(90)2.00.4
Table 3
Tests to reach criterion for test sets
Mean tests to criterionSet N
Experts NovicesNovices Experts
12A 12 2.0 (1–6) 3.8 (1–12)
2.3 (1–4)12 3.7 (1–9)12B
10 12C 3.2 (1–6) 4.6 (1–14a)
D 10 12 6.0 (1–14a)5.8 (2–10)
4.53.2Mean
a Some novices (one on the heterogeneous set and two on the
homogeneous set) failed to pass the criterion in the 13 tests we
allowed. In calculating the means in this table, we conservatively
assumed that these participants would have passed on the next (14th)
test.
Table 2
Training procedure for test sets
TaskTrials
1 Individual inspect (six Greebles at once)
Naming with response6
6 Naming with feedback
Naming12
Naming with feedback6
12 Naming
6 Naming with feedbacka
Naminga12
Total number of trials61a
a If performance on the third naming task was not perfect, partici-
pants performed the naming with feedback and naming tasks again,
and continued to cycle through these tasks until a perfect score was
obtained on the naming task, or until 13 cycles had elapsed.
4 For this and subsequent analyses in this Section, we treated each
participant’s performance on each test set as an independent observa-
tion, because some expert participants learned all four sets, some
experts learned only two of the sets, and all novices learned only two
sets each.
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Fig. 7. Performance by experts and novices on the first three tests when learning new sets of Greebles.
Since participants were required to perform at least
three tests on each set of Greebles (even if they passed
the criterion on the first or second test), we were also
able to compare experts’ and novices’ performance on
each of these three tests. ANOVAs including the factors
of expertise, test set, and test number revealed signifi-
cant main effects of all three variables on both accuracy
and response time (expertise: F(1, 252)7.19 for accu-
racy and F(1, 252)14.8 for RT; test set: F(3, 252)
8.89 and F(3, 252)4.78; test number: F(2, 252)5.16
and F(2, 252)12.9). The interaction of expertise and
test set was marginally significant for accuracy and
significant for RT, F(3, 252)2.15 and F(3, 252)
4.36. No other interactions approached significance.
Inspection of the data revealed that patterns of effects
were very similar for test sets A and B, but were
somewhat different for set C and set D. Therefore, Fig.
7 shows results for the first two sets combined, and for
the second two tests separately.
For the first two test sets, experts were considerably
more accurate and faster than novices at recognizing
test Greebles on each of the first three tests (Fig. 7).
Note that experts achieved 88% accuracy on the very
first test, after seeing the test Greebles only three times
each, and were nearly perfect (95% accuracy) on the
second test, after seeing the Greebles six times each. In
contrast, novices were only accurate on 77% of trials by
the second test.
Test Set D was apparently more difficult to learn
than set C for both novices and experts, suggesting that
all participants relied on body shape information when
it was diagnostic for individual discrimination. Experts
did not show a marked advantage over novices for
either of these two test sets. This could be due to either
or both of two factors. First, these test sets were
learned some 8–13 weeks after the conclusion of ex-
perts’ training, so it is possible that participants ‘lost’
their expertise during this time. Second (and, we feel,
more likely), the Greebles in these test sets contained
parts that were more homogeneous than those in the
original training set or in test sets A and B. Thus
discriminating two Greebles from test set D may have
been as difficult for Greeble experts as discriminating
twin brothers would be for face experts.
In other words, experts may not have been especially
proficient at extracting the information required to
discriminate Greebles in the second pair of test sets.
Rather than using their specialized knowledge of how
to discriminate Greebles such as the ones in the training
set, where body shape was relatively uninformative and
appendage parts were highly diagnostic, experts pre-
sumably had to revert to the same strategies used by
novices. A correlational analysis of performance on the
Greebles in the second and first pairs of test sets
(collapsed across the first three tests on each set) pro-
vides some support for this hypothesis. For the second
pair of sets, the correlation of expert and novice accu-
racy over the 12 Greebles was 0.71. For the first pair of
sets, this correlation was 0.56 for all 12 Greebles, but
this number is inflated by one Greeble on which experts
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and novices were accurate 100 and 98% of the time,
without this Greeble, the correlation dropped to 0.26.
Thus for the first pair of tests, experts and novices
seem to have used different sources of information to
learn the Greebles (since different Greebles were
difficult and easy to learn for the two participant
groups), whereas for the second pair of tests, experts
and novices used the same sources of information
(however, see Section 6 for evidence that experts
nonetheless processed the Greebles in set C differently
than novices).
To summarize, the results of Section 3 indicate that
our experts did ‘learn how to learn’ during the train-
ing procedure, in that: (a) they reached a perfect-ac-
curacy criterion faster than novices for all four
Greeble test sets; and (b) were faster and more accu-
rate than novices on the first three training tests for
test sets A and B. However, the expertise derived
from our training procedure appeared not to have
transfered well to the second two test sets, in which
Greebles were relatively harder to distinguish on the
basis of individual parts. This may indicate that one
aspect of the expertise resulting from our training
procedure is knowledge of the specific ways in which
Greebles in the training set differ. That is, experts
may have acquired a psychological similarity space [8]
capturing the variation among Greebles in the train-
ing set, and became very good at extracting the diag-
nostic information about any one Greeble that
differentiated it from other members of the set. Since
Greebles in the first pair of test sets were drawn from
the same pool as the training set, experts were better
at learning to distinguish these Greebles from each
other than were novices, who did not have an a priori
representation of the similarity space for the set.
Greebles in the second pair of test sets effectively
formed different similarity spaces from the space of
training Greebles, and therefore were as difficult to
learn for experts as for novices.
The present findings are consistent with other ex-
amples of expertise failing to generalize to subcate-
gories of objects. Diamond and Carey [6] found the
inversion effect (a large advantage in performance
when stimuli are studied upright rather than inverted)
in dog show judges to be much larger for breeds in
their domain of expertise as compared to other
breeds. Myles-Worsley et al. [9] report that radiologi-
cal expertise with X-ray films is specific to clinically
significant deviations. Moreover, we all experience
from time to time the limits of our face expertise,
when having to discriminate twins or people from a
less familiar race—indeed, Rhodes et al. [10] found
that the inversion effect was larger for faces of the
participants’ own race than for different-race faces.
4. Sensitivity to configural information
The results of Section 3 suggest that one of the ways
in which experts and novices differ is in their knowl-
edge of what kinds of information are helpful in distin-
guishing different Greebles from one another. Experts
and novices may also differ in the way they process
distinguishing information about Greebles. Specifically,
prior studies indicate that experts process information
‘configurally’. Although the term has been used some-
what loosely in the past, we define configural processing
as the ability to take into account the precise relations
between different parts of objects as well as the parts
themselves.
Much of the evidence that expertise leads to
configural processing is based on the inversion effect,
and is thus indirect: we know that inversion disrupts
recognition of objects for which people are experts
(faces for all humans [11–13] and dogs and birds for
dog and bird experts [6]), and inversion is thought to
disrupt the use of configural cues more than the use of
featural cues [14–16]. Tanaka and his colleagues [17,18]
developed a more direct way of testing whether the
relationships between parts are important for recogni-
tion of objects in a given class. They had participants
recognize parts of faces or control stimuli (scrambled
faces, inverted faces, or houses) in a forced-choice
procedure where the parts were presented: (1) in their
original configurations (Jim’s nose in Jim’s original
face); (2) in a transformed configuration (Jim’s nose in
Jim’s face with his eyes slightly moved apart); or (3) in
isolation (Jim’s nose alone). If participants used inde-
pendent part representations to perform the task, there
should have been no difference between the three con-
ditions. Instead, results showed that parts of upright
faces (but not of control stimuli) were better recognized
in the original configuration than in the transformed
configuration or in isolation. Crucially, the fact that
moving the eyes slightly apart impaired the recognition
of the nose and mouth provided strong evidence that
participants could not ignore relations between face
parts, even when told to do so.
Gauthier and Tarr [4] showed that the old:new
configuration advantage (better part-identification in
the original than in the transformed configuration) can
be obtained for Greebles with experts but not novices,
suggesting that the crucial dimension in the Tanaka
studies was not stimulus category but rather participant
expertise. Gauthier and Tarr [4] as well as Tanaka et al.
[19] found that both novices and experts could display
a whole:part advantage with stimuli such as Greebles,
cars or cells. Tanaka and Gauthier [2] interpreted this
as evidence that although novices may sometimes rely
on first-order relational properties (e.g. the quiff is
located between the boges), only experts seem to rely
on second-order relational properties (e.g. the angle of
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Fig. 8. Stimulus conditions for the configural test.
the boges). Section 4 investigates whether our experts
would also demonstrate such configural sensitivity
when attempting to recognize Greeble parts. In Gau-
thier and Tarr [4], the change in the transformed
configuration was so subtle that most novices did not
notice it. Here, we used three increasingly obvious
configural transformations, the most radical of which
was readily perceivable by novices. This procedure al-
lowed us to test whether the performance costs associ-
ated with transformed configurations is related to the
amount of configural change, and whether novices
would also show a configural effect when they explicitly
noticed the change in configuration.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
The 12 experts trained in Section 2, as well as a
second group of 11 novices (who had no prior exposure
to the Greebles), served as participants. An additional
novice’s data had to be dropped because he or she used
the wrong keys in the test.
4.1.2. Materials
Six Greebles (test set A, Fig. 6) that were not used in
the training, and were thus equally unfamiliar to
novices and experts, served as stimuli. For each Gree-
ble, four target versions were generated (Fig. 8): in
Version 0 (old configuration), all parts were in their
original positions; in Version 1, the dunth (bottom
part) was moved down slightly; in Version 2, the dunth
was moved down even more; and in Version 3, the
boges (top parts) were moved 15° around the vertical
axis towards the front. Distractors were also created for
each version of each Greeble; distractors were identical
to targets, except that one of the three parts (boges,
quiff, or dunth) was replaced by the corresponding part
from a different Greeble from the test set. Finally,
images of the three parts of each Greeble in isolation
were also created. Each isolated part served once as a
target and once as a distractor.
4.1.3. Procedure
Both novices and experts were first taught to name
the six test Greebles, as described in Section 3. They
then received instructions for the Configural Test. Each
trial consisted of a 1000 ms blank screen, a 250 ms
fixation cross, a prompt, shown for 2000 ms, specifying
one part of a particular Greeble (e.g. ‘SOSFA’S
BOGES’), and finally two stimuli shown side-by-side,
which stayed on the screen until participants responded.
One stimulus was the target, and showed the specified
part (SOSFA’s boges) on Version 0, 1, 2, or 3 of the
specified Greeble (SOSFA). The other stimulus was a
distractor, and showed a different part (e.g. FERZU’s
boges) on the specified Greeble (SOSFA). Participants
were to select whether the right or left image contained
the designated part by pressing one of two keys. Each
individual part was the target in four trials: once each
embedded in Versions 0, 1, 2, and 3 of its Greeble.
Following these 72 trials (6 Greebles3 parts4
versions), participants performed the same task on the
isolated Greeble parts. The 18 isolated-part trials (6
Greebles3 parts) were separated from the configural-
change trials because Gauthier and Tarr [4] found that
isolated parts were recognized considerably faster than
parts in the context of whole Greebles, and we hoped
that by separating the two types of trials, we might
reduce some of the variance in each of the two tasks.
4.1.4. Design
Dependent measures were response time and accu-
racy. Group (novice or expert) was manipulated be-
tween participants, while Part (boges, quiff, or dunth)
and stimulus condition (old configuration, new configu-
rations 1, 2, or 3, or isolated part) were within-partici-
pant variables.
4.2. Results
A preliminary analysis including only the three new
configurations (versions 1, 2, and 3) showed no main
effect of Stimulus Condition, and this factor did not
significantly interact with either Group or Part (all
F ’sB1). Therefore, these conditions were collapsed in
subsequent analyses, in which the Stimulus Condition
factor included three levels: old configuration, new
configuration, and isolated part.
An ANOVA on response times revealed significant
main effects of all three factors: Experts were faster
than novices (2352 and 3345 ms, respectively), F(1,
21)4.45; boges (2130 ms) were more quickly recog-
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Fig. 9. Accuracy rates for experts and novices on the configural test. Error bars represent standard errors of the means for each individual
condition.
nized than quiffs (3425 ms) which were more quickly
recognized than dunths (3711 ms), F(2, 42)19.1; and
the isolated part condition (2446 ms) was faster than
either of the other two conditions (2985 and 2993 ms
for old and new configurations, respectively), F(2,
42)7.31. However, no interactions approached sig-
nificance for response times.
Accuracy rates for each grouppartstimulus con-
dition combination are shown in Fig. 9. An ANOVA
on this data revealed significant main effects of Group,
F(1, 21)8.02, and Part, F(2, 42)58.34, significant
two-way interactions of GroupPart, F(2, 42)6.59,
and PartStimulus Condition, F(4, 84)2.86, and a
marginally significant three-way interaction, F(4, 84)
2.32, P0.064. To further investigate the latter effect,
we performed separate ANOVAs on experts’ and
novices’ data, and computed post-hoc LSD tests to
determine when the old configuration condition was
significantly different from the new configuration or
isolated part conditions. This analysis indicated that for
experts, quiffs were significantly easier to recognize in
their old configurations than as isolated parts, PB0.01,
or in their new configurations, P0.059. For novices,
dunths were easier to recognize in their old configura-
tions than as isolated parts, PB0.05, although since
performance in the isolated part condition was below
chance, the significance of this result should be inter-
preted with caution.
4.3. Discussion
In a part recognition task that was considerably
different than all the tasks used during expertise train-
ing, our experts performed more accurately and faster
than novice participants, indicating again that their
expertise was quite generalizable across tasks and Gree-
bles. A second result was that participants were more
accurate in the old configuration condition than in the
isolated parts condition. However, as in other studies
[4,19], this was true for both experts and novices;
furthermore, participants were also substantially faster
in the isolated parts condition, indicating the possibility
of a speed-accuracy trade-off [4]. Therefore, the part:
whole advantage should not be taken as an expertise
effect here.
On the other hand, a significant old:new configura-
tion advantage was found for experts but not novices,
and is not subject to speed-accuracy tradeoffs. This
expert-novice difference was obtained despite the fact
that configuration changes were readily perceivable by
novices, unlike in Gauthier and Tarr’s study [4]. In the
present study, the old:new advantage was only found
for quiffs, not for dunths or boges. It is interesting that
the only part not moved in the new configuration
condition was the one for which we found the predicted
old:new configuration advantage. However, previous
studies [4,18] found the whole:part advantage and old:
new configuration advantage with all tested parts, not
just a single part.
While the present results could be interpreted as a
failure to replicate Gauthier and Tarr’s findings [4],
several differences between the training and test
methodologies of the two studies could be responsible
for the discrepant results. One potentially problematic
(in hindsight) aspect of the present experiment could be
the particular set of Greebles chosen for testing. As is
obvious in Fig. 6, the boges of these Greebles (set A)
were all highly distinctive; compare these Greebles to
set B, where no one part is as uniformly diagnostic.
Furthermore, participants would have been alerted to
the diagnosticity of the boges at the beginning of the
learning procedure, when the six Greebles were shown
on the screen in a group (neither Gauthier and Tarr,
nor Tanaka and Sengco, ever showed more than one
stimulus at a time during learning [4,18]). In fact, most
experts reported on a post-test questionnaire that they
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focused on the boges to learn these Greebles, and both
experts and novices performed practically at ceiling in
recognizing these parts on the test. Furthermore, the
dunths, which were the parts farthest from the boges
and thus presumably farthest from participants’ focus
of attention during training, were very poorly recog-
nized by both novices and experts. The quiffs, which
were spatially close to the boges but were not particu-
larly diagnostic for recognition, were much better rec-
ognized by experts than by novices, and were the part
for which a significant old:new configuration difference
was found for experts (but not for novices).
Although post-hoc, this account is broadly consistent
with the view that object recognition is based neither on
undifferentiated images nor on a fixed vocabulary of
features:parts—rather, objects are represented in terms
of functional features that are acquired based on the
training context and can be modified by experience
[20,21]. Thus all participants may have focused on the
boges to distinguish between the test Greebles, but
experts used the larger ‘head’ region, including both the
boges and the quiff.
One caveat may be in order: Ashby and Maddox [22]
have shown that it is logically possible for subjects to
demonstrate ‘redundancy gains’ (i.e. facilitation from a
to-be-ignored dimension when attention is directed to a
second dimension) in the absence of configural process-
ing. More specifically, their results indicate that tasks
such as the part recognition test and composite test
(Section 5) used here cannot provide definitive evidence
that participants are processing features configurally or
holistically; rather, participants could simply be using
an optimal decision strategy. However, Ashby and
Maddox [23] found that participants were not using an
optimal criterion after 100 trials of practice categorizing
simple stimuli (rectangles). It is thus unlikely that our
experts could have reached an optimal decision strategy
in the configural test used here given the limited num-
ber of trials (90) and the complexity of the stimuli.
5. Recognition of composite greebles
Another experimental task on which differential ef-
fects have been shown for faces and non-face objects is
the ‘composite task’. Young et al. [24] had participants
identify the parts of composites made out of the top
and bottom halves of two different faces, and found
that part-recognition was slower when the two halves of
the composite were aligned (effectively forming a new
face) than when misaligned. Intuitively, the composite
effect seems to reflect the same kind of configural
processing revealed by the old:new configuration ad-
vantage [18] and the inversion effect [13]. However,
Carey and Diamond [5], on the basis of developmental
evidence, suggested that the composite effect may
reflect a more general mechanism that can be termed
holistic processing. We define this type of processing as
the ability or tendency to consider all parts of an object
simultaneously, regardless of the exact configuration of
the parts.5 Carey and Diamond’s hypothesis is that
when halves of two different faces are aligned, one
cannot help but consider the entire stimulus as a single
object, so the half that is not supposed to be recognized
has an interfering effect. With misaligned composites,
on the other hand, we can consider the two halves
separately, ignoring the distracting information from
the half that is not to be recognized.
We initially probed for differences between our ex-
perts and novices in a very difficult version of the
composite test (employing stimuli composed of portions
of three different Greebles each) using Greebles from
test set B, but found no meaningful differences between
the two participant groups or between aligned and
misaligned Greebles. This null result was preceded by
two other failed attempts to find a composite effect
with Greebles (unpublished pilot experiments per-
formed on the experts from Gauthier and Tarr’s study
[4]). In the present experiment, we attempted to repli-
cate as closely as possible the conditions that have
proved most amenable to a composite effect in the past.
First, stimuli were composed of the top half of one
Greeble combined with the bottom half of another, just
as the top and bottom half of faces were used in
previous studies. Second, we used the 20 Greebles on
which experts were trained in Section 2, since there is
some evidence that the composite effect may be easier
to obtain with famous faces ([24]; also see [25]). These
Greebles were familiar only to experts (and the test
procedure requires that participants know the names of
the Greebles), so we were not able to test novices.
Finally, because when famous faces are used it is the
faces that are assumed to be famous and not the
particular pictures, we used mirror-images of the 20
familiar Greebles to reduce image-based similarity.
In addition to testing composites made up of two
different Greebles, we also included trials in which the
two halves of famous Greebles were presented either
aligned or misaligned. Our prediction was that when
the two halves of a stimulus were from different Gree-
bles, experts would be faster when the halves were
misaligned than when they were aligned (this is the
traditional composite effect), whereas when the two
halves were from the same Greeble, experts would be
faster for aligned than for misaligned stimuli. For the
composite stimuli, the two Greebles used could either
5 Note that the terms ‘configural’ and ‘holistic’ are not meant to
imply a pixel-like representation based on linear coordinates. Rather,
we assume only that local features, compositional or otherwise,
areinterdependent in a manner that leads to sensitivity to configural
changes.
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Fig. 10. Stimuli for the composite test.
5.1.2. Materials
Stimuli were constructed by splitting in half and
recombining the 20 Greebles for which participants
learned names in the training. For each Greeble, four
versions were tested (Fig. 10): two halves of different
Greebles (composites) aligned or misaligned, and two
halves of the same Greeble (originals) aligned or mis-
aligned. Composites could either combine two Greebles
from the same family (body type), or two Greebles
from different families. All images were mirror-re-
versed, to disrupt ‘template-matching’ processes that
experts might otherwise have used on these highly-over-
learned images.
5.1.3. Procedure
Prior to the test, participants received two blocks of
the naming with feedback task, to remind them of the
Greebles’ names (performance on these tasks is de-
scribed in Section 2). In the composite test, participants
saw each stimulus twice, once preceded by the prompt
‘QUIFF’ and once preceded by the prompt ‘DUNTH’.
They were required to press the key corresponding to
the first letter of the name of the Greeble from which
the prompted part came from. That is, if the prompt
was ‘QUIFF’ and the top half of the stimulus was from
the Greeble ‘VALI’, the correct response was ‘V’. To
prevent participants from focusing solely on the
prompted region, each stimulus appeared at a random
position on the screen.
5.1.4. Design
Dependent measures were response time and accu-
racy; independent variables were Version (original,
composite-same family, or composite-different families)
and Alignment (aligned or misaligned), both within
participant. Because of an experimenter error, the part
judged on each trial (quiff or dunth) was not recorded,
so this variable could not be analyzed.
be members of the same family (i.e. share the same
body shape) or members of different families (Fig. 10).
Assuming that the composite effect is caused by partic-
ipants ‘fusing’ the two halves of the stimuli, we might
expect the effect to be stronger for same-family com-
posites, since they should be easier to fuse.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Participants
Participants were the ten experts from Section 2 who
returned for the second test session, 8–13 weeks after
the conclusion of training.
Fig. 11. Performance on the composite test. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean, calculated based on the interaction term of the
analysis of variance [59].
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5.2. Results
Mean accuracy rates and response times are dis-
played in Fig. 11. Note that chance performance in this
task would be 5% correct, as there were 20 possible
responses. The ANOVA on accuracy revealed a signifi-
cant main effect of Version, F(2, 18)9.67, and post-
hoc Scheffe tests revealed that the original condition
was significantly easier than either of the two composite
versions, which did not differ significantly from each
other. Neither the main effect of Alignment nor the
interaction of the two factors was significant. For re-
sponse times, neither the main effects nor their interac-
tion was significant. However, we also performed an
analysis restricted to the response times from the origi-
nal and same-family composite conditions because
these conditions were most likely to lead to a ‘fusion’ of
to the two parts of each stimulus. This analysis revealed
a marginally-significant interaction of version and
alignment, F(1, 9)4.63, P0.06: for original (non-
composite) Greebles, participants were faster on aligned
than misaligned versions; while for same-family com-
posite Greebles, participants were faster on misaligned
than aligned versions.
5.3. Discussion
Participants identified parts of composite Greebles
faster when they were misaligned than aligned, but
identified parts of non-composite (original) Greebles
faster when they were aligned than misaligned. This
experiment thus provides the first evidence of a com-
posite effect for non-face objects. However, this conclu-
sion depends on dismissing results from the
different-family composites, as participants did not
show a composite effect for these items. In our view,
these composites may have been processed similarly to
misaligned, same-family composites: since experts were
very familiar with the five Greeble body shapes, the
new body shapes that emerged from different-family
composites may have aided experts in processing the
two halves separately.
In an ongoing study (Gauthier and Tarr, in prepara-
tion), we obtained a conceptual replication of this result
using a composite test on famous faces. In this experi-
ment, we showed stimuli that were made up of two
halves of faces that were either the same or different
genders. For example, the top half of Tom Cruise’s face
could be paired with the bottom half of Mel Gibson’s
face or the bottom half of Princess Diana’s face. The
composite effect (faster response times to identify face
parts in misaligned than aligned composites) was over
twice as large for same-gender composites as for differ-
ent-gender composites. Thus gender information for
faces, like body-shape information for Greebles, seems
to provide a cue to the visual system about when and
when not to ‘fuse’ two halves of a composite stimulus.
These results probably reflect a mix of configural
processing and more general holistic processing.
Configural processing (consideration of the relations
between parts as well as the parts themselves) is indi-
cated by participants’ faster and more accurate re-
sponses to original (non-composite) Greebles when
aligned than when misaligned. That is, when aligned,
parts of the original Greebles were in the correct
configuration, and participants were able to use this
configural information to their advantage. Holistic pro-
cessing (consideration of all parts together, regardless
of whether they are in the proper configuration or not)
is indicated by the fact that participants were much
more accurate on original than composite Greebles
(regardless of alignment), showing that having all parts
present, even when in the wrong configuration, is
beneficial to recognition. Note that whereas the original
Young et al. task is thought to reflect holistic process-
ing, they never tested recognition in original faces with
aligned vs. misaligned parts. It is this condition that
allows us to also test for both configural and holistic
processing in Part 5. Moreover, for same-family com-
posites (and not for originals), response times were
faster for misaligned than for aligned stimuli. Following
Carey and Diamond [5], this last finding indicates that
parts of aligned composites were processed holistically,
forcing participants to consider parts that were not
relevant to the task but that nonetheless had an inter-
fering effect on performance.
Since novices could not be tested with the present
procedure, the results of Section 5 are not informative
as to whether the composite effect is due to expertise
per se. Instead, the effect could be attributable to the
complex nature of the stimuli themselves (i.e. the fact
that all Greebles share the same basic configuration), a
conclusion drawn by Gauthier and Tarr [4] for the
whole:part advantage (see also [2]). Carey and Dia-
mond [5] have shown that the holistic processing of the
kind tested by the original Young et al. paradigm (our
‘composite’ conditions) does not increase after 6 years
of age. It remains possible that experience with faces
before that age is sufficient to mediate this effect. The
resolution of this issue awaits further study. Neverthe-
less, the fact that we obtained the composite effect with
Greebles eliminates it from the ever-shrinking list of
effects that can be taken as evidence for a face-specific
recognition module.
6. Recognition of transformed Greeble images
The experiments reported in Sections 4 and 5 evalu-
ated the nature of the abilities acquired by experts in
processing Greebles. Another important issue in per-
ceptual expertise is the conditions under which experts
can and cannot perform better than novices; in other
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words, the conditions under which expertise generalizes.
At one extreme, extended practice with a particular
picture of a specific exemplar should make an observer
highly expert at processing that one image. At the other
extreme, expertise almost never generalizes across basic-
level categories—for instance, becoming a dog expert
does not make one a bird expert. In-between these two
extremes lie the conditions under which expertise trans-
fers from known objects of a class to new members of
the same class.
In searching for ways to evaluate the generalizability
of Greeble expertise, we again turned to the face recog-
nition literature. A classic ‘face-specific effect’ is the
inversion effect [26,12,13]: Faces encoded upside-down
(inverted) are more difficult to recognize than upright
faces, and this difference in difficulty is greater for faces
than for other objects. Diamond and Carey [6] sug-
gested that we may not be able to encode inverted faces
using our expert abilities developed on upright faces,
although once a face is encoded at the upright, we may
be able to recognize it in other orientations via normal
object recognition processes.
It could also be that for a class of objects encoun-
tered primarily in a single orientation, experts develop a
strong advantage for this ‘canonical’ orientation over
all others. Supporting this interpretation, Tarr and
Pinker [27] showed that subordinate-level recognition of
novel object classes does show such viewpoint specific-
ity, and Tarr and Gauthier [28,29] further found that
these orientation effects generalize across members of a
class. That is, if one exemplar of a class is easiest to
recognize in a particular viewpoint, other visually simi-
lar members of the class may also be easy to recognize
at that viewpoint. Moses et al. [30] provide specific
evidence for such class-based generalization in faces.
These findings all suggest that expert recognition
should be strongly viewpoint-dependent even for rela-
tively unfamiliar exemplars, provided that objects in the
domain of expertise are generally experienced from a
single viewpoint. We tested this prediction by having
expert and novice participants name upright and mis-
oriented Greebles that had been learned in an upright
orientation. Note that this is not strictly speaking a test
of the ‘inversion effect’, since Greebles will be encoded
at the upright and tested in other orientations. Indeed,
Carey [31] stated that ‘‘…the difficulty [in the inversion
effect] is in forming an adequate representation of an
inverted face, not in coping with a mismatch of orienta-
tion between test and recognition’’.
A second transformation that appears to disrupt face
recognition is brightness reversal: pictures of faces pre-
sented in a photographic negative, thus inverting the
brightness level of each pixel in the pictures, are more
poorly recognized than normal pictures [32–35]. If the
brightness-reversal effect is mediated by expertise, ex-
perts but not novices should be impaired at recognizing
Fig. 12. Stimuli for the rotation and brightness-reversal tests: normal
(left), 180°-rotated (middle), and brightness-reversed (right) Greebles.
brightness-reversed Greebles. This prediction is also
tested here.
The experiments reported in this Section are con-
cerned with the transfer conditions of expertise. Experts
are, by definition, better than novices at recognizing
objects of a given class under some conditions. How-
ever, the experiments reported here test the paradoxical
prediction that under conditions that differ from those
employed during training, experts may actually be
worse, or at least no better, than novices. More specifi-
cally, we predicted that novices would be able to adapt
to new stimulus-presentation conditions (misorientation
and brightness reversal) more readily than experts.
6.1. Method
6.1.1. Participants
For the Rotation Test, the 12 experts from Section 2
and a separate group of 12 undergraduates from Ober-
lin College served as participants. For the brightness-re-
versal test, ten of the 12 experts and a third group of 12
undergraduates from Brown University participated.
6.1.2. Materials and procedure
The rotation test was performed on test set B. Each
trial consisted of a 1000 ms blank screen, a 250 ms
fixation cross, and a Greeble in its familiar upright
orientation or rotated 60, 120, or 180° in the picture
plane (Fig. 12). Participants were required to identify
the Greeble by pressing the key corresponding to the
first letter of its name; the Greeble remained on the
screen until participants responded. One half of the
rotations were clockwise and the other half counter-
clockwise in the picture plane. All six test Greebles were
presented in every orientation twice, once each in two
blocks of 24 trials. The order of trials in each block was
randomized.
The brightness-reversal test was performed twice,
once on test set C and once on test set D. Although two
of the novices failed to reach the criterion in learning
one or both of the test sets, they were still significantly
above chance on the brightness-reversal test, so their
data was included in the analyses. Each trial again
consisted of a 1000 ms blank screen and a 250 ms
fixation cross, followed by a test Greeble, which re-
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Fig. 13. Mean response times for experts and novices on the rotation test (left) and brightness-reversal test (right). Error bars represent standard
errors of the means for each individual condition.
mained on the screen until the participant responded by
pressing the key corresponding to the Greeble’s name.
On one half of the trials, the Greeble was displayed in
its normal color scheme, while in the other half, the
brightness of each pixel in the test image was inverted
(Fig. 12). All test Greebles were presented twice each in
their normal and inverted forms.
6.1.3. Design
Accuracy and response times served as the dependent
variables in both tests. Relevant independent variables
were group (expert or novice), and block (1 or 2), and
rotation angle (0, 60, 120, 180) for the rotation test, and
group, test set (heterogeneous or homogeneous), and
brightness (normal or inverted) for the brightness-rever-
sal test. Group was a between-participants variable,
while the other factors were all manipulated within-par-
ticipants. Since there were relatively few observations
per participant per cell, and relatively few participants,
we were concerned that outlier response times would
bias our results. Therefore, we excluded response times
greater than 5000 ms from analysis, eliminating the
slowest 3.7 and 4.9% of the correct responses from the
rotation and brightness-reversal tests, respectively.
6.2. Results: rotation test
Preliminary ANOVAs including the factor of rota-
tion angle (0, 60, 120, 180°) revealed a significant main
effect on both response times and accuracy, but post-
hoc tests indicated that differences between the misori-
ented conditions were miniscule and not significant
(mean response times of 1621, 1621 and 1611 ms for 60,
120 and 180° orientations, respectively). Therefore,
these rotation angles were combined in subsequent
analyses, which included an orientation factor (upright
or misoriented).
Compared to novices, experts were numerically, but
not significantly, faster, F(1, 22)1.63, P0.22 and
significantly more accurate, F(1,22)5.96 overall. Both
experts and novices were faster and more accurate on
the second than on the first block of trials; this effect
was significant for RT, F(1,22)31.2, and marginally
significant for accuracy, F(1,22)3.73, P0.07. The
main effect of Orientation was significant for both RT
and accuracy, F(1,22)16.7 and F(1,22)7.74 respec-
tively, indicating that upright Greebles were recognized
considerably easier than misoriented ones. Two interac-
tions were also significant: blockorientation for accu-
racy, F(1,22)6.15, and groupblockorientation
for RT, F(1,22)8.87. The former interaction reflects
the fact that for accuracy, the difference between up-
right and misoriented Greebles was smaller for the
second block of trials than the first. More interestingly,
the three-way interaction of group, block, and orienta-
tion indicates that for RT, this effect occurred for
novices, but not for experts. This interaction is shown
in Fig. 13: Novices were 231 ms faster at recognizing
upright compared to misoriented Greebles on the first
block of trials, but this difference disappeared (13
ms) on the second block. For experts, on the other
hand, the difference between upright and misoriented
Greebles was actually larger in the second than in the
first block (block 1: 180 ms; block 2: 274 ms).
6.3. Results: brightness-re6ersal test
Mean accuracy rates on the brightness-reversal test
were slightly higher for normal than for reversed Gree-
bles in all four group-test set conditions (overall means
0.88 for normal and 0.85 for inverted), but no main
effects or interactions were significant in the ANOVA.
Mean response times are plotted in Fig. 13. The main
effect of group was not significant, but the main effects
of test set and brightness were, F(1, 20)19.3 and
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6.55, respectively. The interaction of interest, between
group and brightness was also significant, F(1, 20)
5.57. The source of this interaction can be seen in Fig.
13: experts were more impaired by brightness reversal
than were novices. Post hoc LSD tests confirmed that
experts were reliably slower (224 ms) at naming bright-
ness-reversed Greebles than normal Greebles (PB
0.005) while the equivalent difference for novices (10
ms) was not reliable (P0.88). Although reversed
Greebles from the heterogeneous set were especially
difficult for experts to recognize, the three-way interac-
tion of group, test set, and brightness was not signifi-
cant, FB1, so results from the two test sets are
combined in Fig. 13.
6.4. Discussion
Results from the rotation and brightness-reversal
tests supported our prediction that novices would more
easily adapt to new stimulus presentation conditions
than would experts. On the rotation test, the significant
three-way interaction of group, block, and orientation
indicates that novices, but not experts, became as fast
at recognizing misoriented Greebles as they were at
recognizing upright Greebles. That is, although experts
were faster overall at recognizing Greebles, they re-
mained relatively impaired on misoriented (compared
to upright) Greebles even with practice; novices became
as fast with misoriented as with upright Greebles. On
the brightness-reversal test, experts but not novices
were slower at recognizing brightness-reversed as com-
pared to normal Greebles, as demonstrated by the
significant two-way interaction of group and brightness.
Unlike in tests of the inversion effect with faces and
other stimuli [6,36], experts did not show a large advan-
tage in accuracy for upright over misoriented Greebles
(or for normal over brightness-reversed Greebles).
However, as previously suggested by Carey [37], the
effect of mismatch in orientation between study and
test is not the same as the difficulty in encoding in-
verted faces. Indeed, Ashworth and Tarr (in prepara-
tion) found that novice participants showed similar
effects of rotation in recognizing both Greebles and
faces that were learned upright.
Rather than comparing them to face inversion ef-
fects, the present findings are perhaps best considered in
terms of canonicality effects in the object recognition
literature [38]. The difficulty in naming any misoriented
object depends, almost by definition, on participants
having adopted a canonical orientation for an object
class. The upright orientation was originally canonical
for novices, but with a short amount of practice (block
1), the naming advantage for upright compared to
misoriented Greebles disappeared in block 2. For ex-
perts, on the other hand, the canonicality of the upright
orientation was much stronger (having been fostered
over 9 h of training), leading performance on misori-
ented Greebles to be equally impaired in both blocks.
The implication of the present findings, that repre-
sentations and:or processes used by experts are ‘hyper-
specific’ with regard to novel stimulus presentation
conditions, is intriguing considering that expertise does
facilitate recognition of novel exemplars of a class. In
other words, expertise generalizes to new members of a
class, but does not always generalize to new stimulus
conditions. This conclusion has important implications
for models of expertise performance. Specifically, it
may indicate that expertise is based on view- and
image-specific representations of learned exemplars.
Recognition using such representations would be par-
ticularly susceptible to image transformations such as
orientation and brightness reversal.
A final point of discussion from Section 6 concerns
the relative difficulty of misoriented and brightness-re-
versed Greebles for experts and novices. In recognizing
brightness-reversed Greebles, experts were actually
slower than novices, while for misoriented Greebles,
experts were slightly faster than novices. One potential
interpretation of these results is that experts tried to
apply their expert processes to brightness-reversed
Greebles and failed, while for misoriented Greebles,
experts used their ‘normal’ object recognition processes,
rather than relying on their expertise [11,39]. However,
it could also be that the difference in patterns for the
two tests is simply due to the fact that experts were not
any better than novices at recognizing even the normal
Greebles used in the brightness-reversal test (test sets C
and D), while experts were better than novices at
recognizing the upright Greebles in the rotation test
(test set B). The conditions under which experts do and
do not attempt to apply their expertise thus remains a
question open to further study.
7. Modeling expertise
The expertise acquired by participants in this study
and in Gauthier and Tarr’s experiments with Greebles
[4], as well as the expertise demonstrated by all human
beings with faces, concerns individual-level recognition
abilities. That is, Greeble experts are very good at
distinguishing individual Greebles from each other
(within the limits outlined in Sections 3 and 6), not just
at distinguishing Greebles from other classes of objects.
The latter task, class-level recognition of Greebles, is
easily accomplished even by novices. Some researchers
(e.g. Jolicoeur [40]) have proposed that separate object
recognition systems are responsible for subordinateor
individual-level and class-level recognition. In such a
dual-system approach, the training in Section 2 would
teach participants to use their subordinate-level recog-
nition systems to recognize Greebles. An alternative
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Fig. 14. Architecture of the WHOA model. Although all connections
are not drawn, every unit in the imagery layer is connected to every
unit in the identification layer, and vice-versa. In interpreting identifi-
cation-layer patterns, values greater than 0 are treated as 1 and
values less than 0 as 1, to produce an ASCII-like format.
7.1. Model architecture and simulation procedure
The basic architecture of WHOA is quite simple (Fig.
14), consisting of two layers of units that are fully
connected both forwards and backwards. The imagery
layer codes a 7575-pixel image in 5625 U, while the
identipcation layer codes arbitrary 24-unit patterns that
can be associated with images. For the present simula-
tions, the model was presented with black-and-white
outline images of the Greebles (shown in Fig. 15) on
the imagery layer.6 Identification-layer patterns can be
interpreted by using sets of six units to represent letters
in an ASCII-like format (unit values are first ‘dis-
cretized’ to 1 or 1 for this interpretation). For the
present simulations, the first letter was used to represent
Greeble genders (‘g’ for GLIPs and ‘P’ for PLOKs), the
second letter Greeble families (‘a’, ‘g’, ‘j’, ‘p’, or ‘u’ for
each of the five families), and the third and fourth
letters individual-level Greeble names (described be-
low).
During training, connection weights are modified by
a variant of the Widrow–Hoff learning rule (a.k.a. the
delta or least-mean squares rule). Given an input pat-
tern f and a target pattern t to be associated with the
input, the change in weights DA is computed by the
following formula:
DAh(tiAf )f T,
where h (eta) is a learning constant, i (iota) is a
‘generalization constant’, and f T is the transposition of
f. When i is 0, this formula reduces to a simple Hebbian
learning rule, while an i of 1 produces the standard
Widrow–Hoff rule. For the present simulations, i was
set to 0.2; see [41] for a discussion of the model’s
behavior with various other values for i.
The training procedure was intended to emulate the
naming with feedback task, in which participants at-
possibility, which we endorse here, is that expert abili-
ties in individual-level recognition can be accomplished
through the same mechanisms that support novice,
class-level recognition. If this hypothesis is correct, our
experts’ general-purpose object recognition system
would simply have been ‘tuned’ to respond more pre-
cisely to Greebles than to other classes of objects.
As a demonstration of how a recognition system
might show such tuning behavior, we simulated several
aspects of the experiments in Sections 2–4 using a
simple neural-network model originally presented by
Williams [41]. The model, dubbed WHOA (for
Widrow–Hoff Object Associator), is capable of learn-
ing both individual- and class-level information about
objects via a single set of processes and representations.
Although originally developed in connection with a
completely different set of stimuli and psychophysical
findings, we were able to apply the WHOA model,
essentially without modification, to Greeble recogni-
tion.
6 Interestingly, pilot simulations using greyscale images of the
Greebles were not as successful as the simulations reported here using
outline contours. The effectiveness of various image formats is a topic
of current investigation with the WHOA model.
Fig. 15. WHOA’s response to six test Greebles of the GLIP gender and ‘a’ family. The silhouettes presented to the model are shown in the top
row, followed by the feedback-image, identification-layer label, and cosine responses to each Greeble.
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tempted to name a Greeble, then saw the Greeble with
its correct label if they were incorrect. Each simulated
training trial involved two phases of weight-modifica-
tion. In the first, the input image was fed through the
forward connections to produce a guessed label, and
both the forward and backward connections were al-
tered based on this guess. For this phase of learning, h
was set to 0.5, leading to incomplete association of the
image with the guess. The second weight-modification
phase depended on whether the guess was correct or
not, where to be correct all four letters in the guessed
label had to exactly match the correct label. If correct,
weights were modified exactly as in the first phase,
completing the learning of the image-guess association.
If incorrect, weights were altered based on the correct
label, with h1.0.
To test the model’s performance, an image was pre-
sented on the imagery layer and fed through the for-
ward connections to produce an identification pattern,
then this identification pattern was fed through the
backward connections to produce a ‘feedback-image’
pattern (connection weights were not altered during
testing). There are two ways to evaluate performance.
The simplest is to compare the letters in the interpreted
identification pattern with the desired letters. This raw
accuracy measure is somewhat crude (since information
is lost when the identification-layer units are discretized
for interpretation), but allows us to evaluate gender-,
family-, and individual-level categorization perfor-
mance independently (i.e. the model could get the gen-
der letter correct but fail to produce the correct
individual-name letters). A more complex measure in-
volves computing the vector cosine of the observed
feedback-image pattern and the original input pattern
[42]. The cosine gives the best assessment of what
WHOA ‘knows’ about a Greeble image, since it takes
into account information stored in both the forward
and backward connection weights.
7.2. Simulation training
The expertise training in Section 2 was simulated by
teaching the model to associate the 30 training Greebles
with appropriate labels. As in the human training,
WHOA began by learning individual names (e.g. ‘LR’)
for only five Greebles, and was initially taught to
associate the other 25 Greebles with a NIL (‘@@’) label
(the identification-layer pattern associated with each
‘@’ character was 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, and
had to be learned by the model just like any other
pattern). In three subsequent sets of trials, WHOA was
taught new individual names for five Greebles that had
been previously associated with the nil label (for exam-
ple, a Greeble might have been associated with the label
‘ga@@’ in the first set of trials, but ‘gaAK’ in the
second set). The final set of trials (in which 20 Greebles
were named and ten unnamed) was then repeated twice.
In each set of trials, the Greebles were presented in a
different random order. Before every individual learn-
ing trial, WHOA was tested on the to-be-learned Gree-
ble. Reminiscent of human participant’s performance,
WHOA was initially much better on unnamed than
named trials for mean raw accuracy, but became essen-
tially perfect (98% correct) on both types of trials by
the end of training. However, the model’s mean cosine
for named Greebles was consistently higher than its
mean cosine for unnamed Greebles.
7.3. Simulation tests
Following training, the model was tested on the 30
training Greebles and 30 additional Greebles that were
not seen during training. The model always produced
the correct gender, family, and individual letters to the
trained Greebles. More interestingly, the model pro-
duced the correct gender and family letters for un-
trained Greebles with 97 and 95% accuracy,
respectively. The high level of gender performance was
especially surprising: WHOA learned the ‘rule’ for gen-
der discrimination (whether boges, quiffs, and dunths
point up or down) even though no two Greebles’ parts
were exactly the same. Furthermore, the model very
rarely overgeneralized—in response to an unknown
Greeble, it produced an individual label of a known
Greeble only 1.3% of the time. Fig. 15 shows the
model’s response to six test Greebles of one gender and
family. The three Greebles on the left were trained and
the three on the right untrained. Note that the model
produced very similar feedback-images to each of the
untrained Greebles; this feedback-image could be con-
sidered the ‘prototype’ for all Greebles of this gender
and family (see [41] for a detailed discussion of proto-
type effects in WHOA). Also note that the individual-
level letters generated to the last Greeble, ‘FL’, are a
combination of the first two trained Greebles’ names,
reflecting the fact that this Greeble’s dunth was similar
to to gaAL’s, but its left boge and head shape was more
similar to gaFD’s.
WHOA was also trained to name the four novel
Greeble test sets from Section 3 (Fig. 6). The model was
given eight runs of trials with each test set, and training
performance was evaluated as above. Performance by
ten simulated experts was compared to performance by
ten simulated novices, where the model was not given
any training prior to learning the test sets (different
simulation runs produced different results because of
the random ordering of Greebles during learning trials).
Raw accuracy was somewhat higher for the novice
(73%, averaged over the last two training runs and all
four test sets) than the expert model (67%), although
the cosine measure was much higher for the expert than
the novice model throughout training (first run: expert
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Fig. 16. Mean cosine measures for expert (solid lines) and novice
(dashed lines) models learning Greebles in old (original; circles) and
new (triangles) configurations.
responded much more strongly to Greebles in the old
configuration, especially when it first began learning
names for the set.
7.4. Discussion
In summary, the WHOA model was able to learn
both individuating information and class-level informa-
tion about Greebles, using a common set of units and
connection weights. When trained on the 30 Greebles
used in Section 2, the model showed performance pat-
terns on named and unnamed items that were qualita-
tively similar to those of human participants. When
tested on the 30 trained Greebles and on a new set of 30
untrained Greebles, WHOA always correctly recalled
the gender, family, and individual names of trained
Greebles, almost always correctly classified untrained
Greebles by family and gender, and almost never con-
fused trained with untrained inclividuals. Finally, when
trained to learn names for new sets of Greebles, expert
ancl novice models acquired the names at similar rates,
but the expert model attained much higher cosines than
the novice model, reflecting greater knowledge of the
Greeble images themselves. This result is consistent
with the fact that expertise effects were found with Test
Sets C and D in the brightness-reversal test even though
expert participants were not substantially faster than
novices at acquiring names for these Greebles in Sec-
tion 3.
The generalization ability of simple neural-network
models has been documented in past reports by Knapp
and Anderson [43] and McClelland and Rumelhart [44].
The novel aspect of WHOA is its ability to individuate
trained Greebles at the same time that it learns to
generalize to untrained Greebles. That is, the model
acquires through training the ability to efficiently pro-
cess novel instances of the Greeble class, but also
retains the ability to distinguish among and provide
labels for individual Greebles it has already learned.
These abilities stem from a combination of two factors.
First, the small amount of gradient-descent learning
incorporated in the learning rule constantly pushes the
network to respond most strongly to trained exemplars.
Second, individuating information is explicitly stored
(via the two-letter individual-level label) for each
trained exemplar in its associated identification-layer
pattern. The fact that the expert model attained higher
cosines than the novice model on novel sets of test
items indicates that WHOA’s ‘knowledge’ of Greebles
was not limited to the particular Greebles on which it
was trained. Like our expert participants, the model
also learned information that helped it to process new
Greebles. Also like our expert participants, the model
was not as good at learning names for Greebles with
very subtle part differences (test set D), and was im-
paired in processing Greebles whose part-configurations
0.42, novice 0.06; last run: expert 0.81, novice 0.63;
averaged over all sets). Thus the expert model was not
facilitated at learning names for new Greebles, but did
learn considerably more information about Greeble
images than the novice model. Raw accuracy was ap-
proximately equivalent on test sets A (77%, averaged
over the last two training runs and over novices and
experts) and B (69%), and was much worse on set D
(38%), as was the case for human participants. How-
ever, the model found it very easy to learn the names of
set C (96%), while human participants had more
difficulty on this set than sets A and B. This result
reflects the fact that the model was particularly good at
distinguishing Greebles on the basis of body shape (the
Greebles in set C all had different body shapes); appar-
ently humans are not as good at utilizing this informa-
tion. Interestingly, the cosine measure was essentially
identical for the four sets in the expert model (0.83,
0.86, 0.80 and 0.80 in the last run of trials; for the
novice model, cosines were 0.68, 0.73, 0.50, 0.71).
In a final simulation, expert and novice models were
taught names for test set A Greebles in the new
configurations used in Section 4 (only the most extreme
configuration change was tested; Fig. 8 Version 3).
Although this simulation was not directly analogous to
the old:new configuration test, we expected the expert
model to demonstrate quicker learning of Greebles in
the old configuration than in the new configuration, if
the model ‘learned’ anything about Greeble configura-
tions during training. Fig. 16 shows mean cosines in
each of the eight training runs for the old configura-
tions (this is the data described in the last paragraph)
and new configurations. Predictably, the novice model
showed virtually identical training patterns for the two
configurations; since this model knew nothing about
Greebles before it began, it did not matter which
configuration it learned. The expert model, however,
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had been altered. While WHOA is only a demonstra-
tion model, not a full-fledged model of object recogni-
tion, its successes indicate that expert, individual-level
recognition and novice, class-level recognition may be
accomplished by the same cognitive system.
8. General discussion
We began this paper by asking whether the visual
recognition mechanisms used by experts are the same as
those used by novices. Although this question has been
addressed in previous studies, they have typically used
extant experts (e.g. face or dog experts), and therefore
suffer from numerous limitations resulting from the
unconstrained nature of expertise acquisition in every-
day settings, such as the limited control over the train-
ing conditions and the confounding of perceptual and
semantic learning (see [23] for one example of an exper-
imental manipulation of expertise). In Section 2 of the
present study, we showed how participants can be
trained to become experts at recognizing individual
exemplars of a novel class of objects (Greebles). Section
2 also demonstrated how performance on two tasks,
Verification and Naming, changed as participants pro-
gressed from being Greeble novices to Greeble experts.
In Sections 3–6, we compared the performance of the
experts trained in Section 2 with the performance of
novice participants on a variety of tasks designed to
investigate: (1) the ways in which objects are repre-
sented and processed differently as a result of expertise,
and (2) the extent to which expertise generalizes to new
exemplars of an object class and to novel viewing
conditions. The results of Sections 4 and 5 suggested
that experts processed Greebles ‘configurally’ and
‘holistically’ [5], while in Sections 3 and 6, expertise
mechanisms exhibited a surprising combination of gen-
eralizability to novel Greeble exemplars, but hyperspe-
cificity for particular viewing conditions. In Section 7,
we showed how a simple neural-network model
(WHOA) could account for several aspects of both
expert and novice Greeble recognition.
8.1. An expert is not an expert is not an expert
Although we (and other researchers) may have often
discussed perceptual expertise as if it were a single,
unified phenomenon, several aspects of the present
results suggest that the participants trained in Section 2
acquired multiple skills over the course of becoming
experts. First, consider the correlational data between
the Verification and Naming tasks in Section 2. Intu-
itively, the two tasks, which involve matching a label to
a picture and generating a label for a picture, respec-
tively, seem quite similar to each other. In accordance
with this intuition, participants’ performance on the
two tasks was, at the start of training, highly correlated
across different Greebles, indicating that similar types
of information were extracted from the images in order
to perform the two tasks. However, over the course of
the ten-session training procedure, this correlation went
steadily down. Further investigation revealed a high
correlation between Verification performance at the
beginning and end of training, but a low correlation
between Naming performance at the beginning and end
of training (intriguingly, the WHOA model also showed
a low item correlation on the cosine measure between
the first and last set of training runs).
One possible interpretation of these findings is as
follows. At the beginning of training, participants may
have keyed in on individual Greeble parts to perform
both the Verification and Naming tasks. In other
words, participants might have identified a particular
Greeble as ‘Pimo’ by its highly distinctive horse-like
quiff, and ‘Vali’ by its dog-like boges. This strategy
would continue to be effective on the Verification task
throughout training, because every time a participant
saw the label ‘PIMO’, she would know to look for the
horse-like quiff in the subsequently-presented Greeble.7
In the Naming task, however, participants are not given
such a cue, so as more Greebles are learned, searching
through the list of distinctive features would become
more difficult. Instead of continuing with this strategy,
participants might have learned to consider all parts
together when performing the naming task. This hy-
pothesis receives some support from Section 5, in which
participants performed essentially the same naming
task, but were asked to base their judgments on only
the top or the bottom half of the test stimulus.
Experts were much more accurate on this task when
the top and bottom halves came from the same Greeble
than when the two halves came from different Greebles,
even when the two halves were misaligned (Fig. 11).
Thus being able to process Greebles ‘holistically’ (eval-
uating all the Greeble’s parts together) aided experts in
identifying an individual part even though the parts
were not in the correct configuration.
Experts may have also learned to process Greebles
‘configurally’, although the effects supporting this con-
clusion in the present study only reached marginal
significance levels (P values between 0.05 and 0.065).
Configural processing can be seen as a more specific
form of holistic processing, where the relations between
parts are considered in addition to the parts them-
selves.8 The first indication of configural processing
7 Note that Gauthier and Tarr [4] found an old:new configuration
advantage in experts following training which included only the
Verification tast, indicating that even if participants do use distinctive
features in Verification, the task must also encourage acquisition of
configural processing abilities.
8 Note that what Carey and Diamond [5] call ‘holistic processing’
implies both mechanisms discussed here. For further discussion of the
various definitions of configural and holistic processing, see [5,60].
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comes from Section 4, where experts but not novices
were more accurate in identifying a Greeble’s quiff
when it was presented in the context of the learned
configuration than in a new configuration (Fig. 9).
Gauthier and Tarr [4], using a paradigm that matched
more closely that previously used with faces [18], found
the same old:new configuration advantage with all
three Greeble parts (quiffs, dunths, and boges), and
again obtained reliable effects with Greeble experts but
not with novices. The second result consistent with
configural processing involves trials from the composite
task of Section 5 in which the top and bottom halves of
displays came from the same Greeble. Experts were
faster and more accurate when the two halves of the
original Greeble were aligned than when the two halves
were misaligned; misalignment obviously alters the
configuration of the Greeble parts. Finally, configural
processing may also be the mechanism by which partic-
ipants learned to perform the Verification task as
quickly with individual labels as with gender labels
(Figs. 4 and 5), an effect that Gauthier and Tarr [4]
gave as their criterion for expertise status.
8.2. Rele6ance of findings to the face-specificity issue
The issue of whether faces are ‘special’ is both com-
plex and independent from the issue of whether exper-
tise effects in visual recognition can be found for
non-face object classes. Admittedly, the results pre-
sented here, by themselves, do not provide compelling
evidence against face-specific processing. While our
Greeble experts display some of the putatively face-spe-
cific behavioral effects (configuration effects on quiffs,
composite effect, contrast inversion), they fail to display
others (orientation inversion effect, configuration effect
on parts other than quiffs). Clearly, the 9 h or so of
training experienced here did not lead our subjects to
process Greebles in exactly the same manner as they
process faces, for which young adults have had approx-
imately 20 years of training. On the other hand there is
some evidence that far less experience may be needed to
show configural effects with faces. Tanaka et al. [45]
have recently demonstrated that children as young as 5
years of age are ‘face experts’ to the extent that they
process upright faces configurally. Of course, the five
years of experience that young children have with faces
is still substantially more than the training that our
experts received with Greebles. Thus, the ability to use
configural coding may develop only slowly, so that
some behavioral effects found with non-face objects
may not reach magnitudes comparable to those found
with faces without an equivalent experience with the
alternate class. Nevertheless, evidence that any behav-
ioral effect can be obtained with at least one class of
non-face stimuli in at least one context should be
sufficient to discredit the effect as evidence for face-spe-
cific processing. Results from the present study suggest
that the contrast inversion effect and composite effect
should no longer be considered face-specific. Orienta-
tion inversion effects [6], old:new configuration effects
[4], and whole:part advantage effects TaGa97 have
been found for alternate stimulus classes elsewhere.
Additional evidence for face-specific processing
comes from neuroimaging [46–51] and neuropsycholog-
ical studies [39,52–54], which our present results do not
address. Even if faces and other objects are considered
to be processed by similar mechanisms, whether any
brain area is or is not face-specific remains an empirical
question [55]. To date results on this issue have been
mixed, with some studies indicating that an area in the
inferior temporal cortex is preferentially activated by
faces [48,56] and other studies suggesting that this same
area can be engaged by within-class recognition of
common objects, such as identifying a car as a Ferrari
or a Honda [57]. Finally, some of us have recently
collected evidence using fMRI which is particularly
relevant to the present study—Gauthier et al. [57,58]
have found that the face area of individuals undergoing
expertise training with Greebles becomes increasingly
activated when discriminating amongst upright (as op-
posed to inverted) Greebles. Thus, there is some evi-
dence that expertise significantly modifies the neural
substrates engaged during object recognition. The simu-
lation data presented in Fig. 16 indicates that some-
thing analogous happens in the neural-network WHOA
model when it is ‘trained’: a subset of the model’s units
are altered in such a way that Greebles presented in
normal configurations are processed differently than
Greebles presented in altered configurations. With this
evidence in mind, it is crucial to understand the percep-
tual mechanisms underlying this change. The results
presented here provide a start in this direction, helping
to elucidate the cognitive structures and processes that
support expert visual recognition.
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